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Résumé / Abstract
Nous examinons les rendements d'ancienneté en France
et nous estimons les effets de cohorte, à la fois dans la politique de
rémunération de l'entreprise et dans son rendement d'ancienneté.
Nous soulignons les biais présents dans plusieurs estimateurs de
rendement d'ancienneté et nous montrons que la flexibilité
introduite par l'estimation des effets de cohorte nous permet de
découvrir des variations à travers les cohortes et à travers les
entreprises qui ne sont pas cohérentes avec aucune des théories de
rémunération trouvées dans la littérature.
We examine empirically returns to seniority in France
and estimate cohort effects in both firm specific compensation
policies and returns to job seniority. We demonstrate the biases
in several estimators of returns to seniority and show that
allowing firm specific compensation policies and returns to
seniority to vary by entry cohort uncovers patterns of variance
within firm and within cohort in estimated intercepts and slopes
that can be explained by no single theory.
Mots clés : rendement d'ancienneté, hétérogénéité des travailleurs,hétérogénéité
des entreprises, effets de cohort
Keywords : Returns to Seniority, Worker Heterogeneity, Firm Heterogeneity,
Cohort Effects
Many people have estimated returns to job seniority for the United States
1
,
and the debate remains open as to whether such returns exist empirically. Even
on the theoretical plane, the regularity and size of within-job increases in wages
over-and-above market increases is still far from being an issue of universal
consensus
2
. This paper proposes to inform this debate by empirically examining
returns to seniority in France
3
and by explicitly estimating cohort eects in
returns to seniority
4
. The question of cohort eects in returns to seniority
is potentially important, as the behavior of these eects can serve as a way to
distinguish between competing theoretical models of returns to seniority
5
. Here,
we simply demonstrate the value of being able to distinguish between entering
cohorts when estimating rm-specic returns to seniority.
We nd that, according to the econometric technique used, the estimations
of returns to job seniority in France vary dramatically. The most basic esti-
mator (ordinary least squares) suggests returns to seniority of 6-7 percent per
year. Accounting for unobserved individual heterogeneity by xed eects causes
this estimate to drop to around 3 percent per year. Allowing for heterogeneity
in rm compensation policies via the Topel (1991) technique causes estimated
returns to seniority to rise back up to around 4.5 percent per year. Allowing
still more heterogeneity, this time in both compensation policy and seniority
returns
6
(via the projection method of Abowd et al. (1994)) implies zero mean
returns to seniority across rms as well as across individuals, although the stan-
dard deviation of the point estimates of returns to seniority is large enough to
encompass even the OLS results within a one-standard deviation band around
the mean. Finally, when we allow rm specic compensation policies and rm
specic returns to seniority to vary by entry cohort, we again nd zero mean
returns, but we nd signicant variance in both the compensation policy and
returns to seniority. This variance is largest across rm/within cohort for com-
pensation policy. Such variation suggests that one needs to take care to account
for cohort and rm heterogeneity when modelling returns to seniority, both in
theoretical and empirical work, in particular because there exists no single the-
ory that can explain the patterns of variance within rm and within cohort that
1
See, for example, Abraham and Farber (1987), Abraham and Farber (1988), Altonji and
Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991).
2
See, for example, Becker (1993), Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), Harris and Holmstrom
(1982), Jovanovic (1979), and MacLeod and Malcomson (1988).
3
Other attempts to estimate returns to seniority in France include Abowd, Kramarz and
Margolis (1994) and Margolis (1995b).
4
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) also estimate cohort eects on wages and show that
there is signicant variation within a rm across cohorts in wages for workers with equivalent
other characteristics. Unfortunately, their analysis makes use of data from only one rm, and
thus it is not clear how general the phenomenon of cohort eects might be.
5
For a more detailed examination of the implications of various theoretical models for
cohort specic returns to job seniority, see Margolis (1995a).
6
We use the term \compensation policy" to designate the starting compensation paid by
a given rm, and we use returns to seniority to describe the evolution of compensation within
a rm after hiring.
1
we observe in our data
7
.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 1 we lay out the statisti-
cal model that we use as a framework for interpreting the dierent estimators
and in section 2 we briey describe the data we will use in the estimations.
We then estimate returns to job seniority by Ordinary Least Squares (section
3) and by OLS allowing for worker-specic xed eects (section 4). We then
apply the estimation strategy suggested by Topel (1991) in section 5 and the
strategy suggested by Abowd et al. (1994) in section 6. We nally apply a new
estimation method, based on the approach suggested by Abowd et al. (1994),
to estimate dierent seniority returns for dierent cohorts within a given rm
in section 7. At each step along the estimation path, which basically traces the
evolution of thought with regard to important concerns in estimating returns
to seniority, we discuss the sorts of biases in the estimated returns that are
eliminated by the particular method, as well as those that remain. We then
suggest an interpretation for the results of the cohort-specic estimations in the
context of several popular explanations of seniority returns in section 8. Section
9 concludes.
1 An Encompassing Descriptive Model of Re-
turns to Job Seniority
In order to be able to incorporate the implications of the variety of dierent
explanations for returns to job seniority into a single theoretical model, we need
to specify a very general empirical model of wage determination. In this paper,
we estimate variants on the following specication.
w
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0
+t
= X
i;T
0
+t
 + 
i
+ 
J(i;T
0
+t);T
0
+ 
J(i;T
0
+t);T
0
s
i;T
0
+t
+ 
i;T
0
+t
(1)
In this specication, i denotes an individual, and T
0
is the date at which the
individual joined her current employer. t measures years of employment with
the current employer, and thus s
i;T
0
+t
= t refers to the seniority of individual i
hired at date T
0
and observed t years after being hired. The function J(i; T
0
+t)
identies the rm j at which individual i works at date T
0
+ t. In other words,
if individual a was hired by rm A in 1980 and is observed in 1986 as still
employed at rm A, then i = a, T
0
= 1980, t = s
a;1986
= 6 and J(a; 1986) = A.
We denote the total annual compensation of individual i observed at the
date T
0
+ t as w
i;T
0
+t
. X
i;T
0
+t
corresponds to a set of individual-specic char-
acteristics that are observable to both the econometrician and the market and
X
i;T
0
+t
 is the market value of these characteristics. 
i
is an individual xed ef-
fect, representing the market value of individual-specic characteristics that are
7
See (Margolis 1995a) for a discussion of how three dierent types of compensationmodels
(implicit contracts a la (Beaudry and DiNardo 1991) or (Harris and Holmstrom 1982), match-
ing a la (Jovanovic 1979), and screening a la (Salop and Salop 1976) or (Margolis 1995b)) can
generate cohort eects in compensation policies and in returns to seniority.
2
observed by the market but unobserved by the econometrician. If the econome-
trician were to observe all of the characteristics that were valued by the market,

i
= 
j
= 0 for all i; j. In models with identical individual eects, 
i
= 
j
= 
for all i; j, and  becomes part of the intercept in the X
i;T
0
+t
matrix. For this
reason, one typically imposes the identication restriction that
P
i

i
= 0 in
models with varying individual eects.

J(i;T
0
+t);T
0
is the cohort-enterprise specic xed eect (intercept) and 
J(i;T
0
+t);T
0
is the cohort-enterprise specic linear return to job seniority t
8
. Note that in
a model with identical rms, 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. In a model with neither cohort eects nor heteroge-
neous rms, 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all T
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. In this last model,  is once again subsumed into the intercept in
X
i;T
0
+t
.
2 The Data
The data used in the empirical work below are the same as those described
in Abowd et al. (1994)
9
. These data, derived from the DAS (Declarations an-
nuelles de Salaire, or Annual Salary Reports) are a panel of employer-employee
matched observations with identifying information sucient to follow both rms
and individuals over time, collected by INSEE (the French National Statistics
Institute). The data cover the period 1976-1987, although observations from
1981 and 1983 were not made available by INSEE. They cover all workers em-
ployed in France born in October of an even-numbered year, thus ensuring a
random initial sample of individuals. The data made available concern all such
people working in enterprises with 10 employees or more, and French govern-
ment employees are also excluded (although employees of government-owned
enterprises are present in the data).
These data were cleaned
10
and compiled into a database containing initially
5,325,352 observations, of which 64.7 percent were from men. A simple regres-
sion of the form
w
i;T
0
+t
= X
i;T
0
+t
 + "
i;T
0
+t
was run on these data, where w
i;T
0
+t
represents the log of the real annualized
total compensation cost, and the vector X
i;T
0
+t
includes the variables male,
8
In the models we estimate below, we typically consider specications with both a linear
return to seniority (as in equation 1) and with a return to seniority that includes higher-order
terms as well. Murphy and Welch (1992) suggest that a specication with terms above the
second order is appropriate, and where possible we will present specication tests that support
this conclusion.
9
Abowd et al. (1994) provide a lengthy data appendix describing the construction of the
data set in detail. Thus we will only briey describe the construction of the data set here.
10
See the data appendix of Abowd et al. (1994) for details on the preliminary treatment of
the data.
3
Paris region, experience through experience to the fourth power
11
, 7 education-
level indicators, and 9 year indicators. All observations more than 5 standard
deviations away from their predicted values were considered outliers. These
observations were eliminated from the data set on which the more complicated
estimators (those of Topel (1991), Abowd et al. (1994) and the cohort-based
estimates) were calculated, although both data sets were used in the OLS and
individual xed eect regressions. Table 1 provides some basic sample statistics
for both of the data sets used.
(insert table 1 about here)
Looking at table 1, one can see that the outliers only comprised 0.38 percent
of the original sample. The outliers-eliminated sample is extremely close to the
overall sample, with most of the outliers apparently being unreasonably low
earners as opposed to unreasonably high earners. The eliminated outliers also
seem to be slightly more experienced and have slightly lower job seniority on
average, but one cannot reject the hypothesis that the two samples are drawn
from the same population with any generally accepted degree of condence.
In the OLS and individual xed eect models, we present Hausman-Wu style
tests of the equivalence of the coecients of level seniority as a check on the
representativeness of the outliers-eliminated sample
12
.
3 Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Returns
to Job Seniority
Our rst set of estimates of returns to job seniority use a simple specication of
the form
log (w
i;T
0
+t
) = X
i;T
0
+t
+ s
i;T
0
+t
+ "
i;T
0
+t
: (2)
There are three dierent assumptions that one might make to justify the elim-
ination of 
i
from the statistical model presented in equation (1), as we do
here. First one might assume that the econometrician observes all of the rel-
evant across-worker heterogeneity. Second, one might assume that all workers
are identical in their cross-worker unobserved heterogeneity, in which case  is
estimated as part of the model intercept. Third, one might suppose that the
existing across-worker heterogeneity in wages is uncorrelated with job seniority
11
Experience is measured as the number of years since the end of schooling (prior to 1976)
plus the cumulated actual labor force experience (from 1976 onwards). See the data appendix
of Abowd et al. (1994) for details.
12
We present results for both the full sample and the outliers eliminated sample in sections
3 and 4 for two reasons. First, we want to demonstrate that the two samples generate similar
results for simple estimators of returns to job tenure. Second, although the full sample has
more observations, Abowd et al. (1994) used the outliers-eliminated sample for their estimates.
We would like to draw conclusions from our Topel (1991) 2-step and cohort-based estimators
from the same data set, and thus we use the outliers-eliminated sample in sections 5, 6 and 7.
4
and the elements of X
i;T
0
+t
. In this case we can consistently estimate  and 
without including the 
i
term, and such a specication would have the mean
value of the unobserved and uncorrelated individual specic heterogeneity being
subsumed into the model intercept.
Next, note that there are no j-specic subscripts anywhere. We are thereby
assuming that either there is no across-rm heterogeneity in intercepts  or se-
niority returns , or that any across-rm heterogeneity in  is uncorrelated with
the X
i;T
0
+t
and the economy-wide . Second, there are no cohort-specic (T
0
)
terms anywhere. Thus if there was no heterogeneity in 
j
, the across-rm new-
employer intercept term  would be subsumed into the intercept in the regres-
sion. If we assumed uncorrelated heterogeneity, the across-rm mean 
j
would
be a part of the intercept. The assumption that there are no cohort-specic
seniority returns, coupled with the assumption that there is no heterogeneity
across rms in seniority returns, means that one can estimate a single return to
seniority  for the entire economy.
We estimate two dierent specications below. In model 1 we include only
level seniority, whereas in model 2 we estimate returns to seniority through se-
niority to the fourth power (rescaled). Other variables included in the matrix
X
i;T
0
+t
were total labor market experience through experience to the fourth
power (rescaled), seven indicators for educational attainment (highest degree
terminated), 9 year indicators, an indicator variable for a job in the Paris
metropolitan area, and an indicator for the sex of the individual. The de-
pendent variable was measured as the log of real annualized total compensation
cost (w). Each model was run on two data sets, the rst containing all obser-
vations and the second being identical to the rst with the outliers eliminated.
Table 2 presents the results of each of the two OLS regressions on each of the
two data sets.
(insert table 2 about here)
A Hausman-Wu style test of equality between the model 1 level seniority coef-
cient on the full and outliers-eliminated data sets cannot be rejected, nor can
the equivalent test on the level seniority coecient in model 2. This suggests
that, as suspected, the relation between level seniority and earnings is not af-
fected by the elimination of outliers. On the other hand, Hausman-Wu tests
for equality of the model 1 and model 2 coecients on level job seniority are
rejected for both the full and outliers-eliminated samples. This suggests that
the most simple OLS model, with only level seniority, is misspecied.
(insert gure 1 about here)
Figure 1 shows the how earnings vary with seniority for a male high-school
graduate living in Paris with 35 years of work experience observed in 1980. It
is interesting to note that, among workers with 35 years of work experience, it
is not those that have been employed the longest that would have the highest
5
predicted earnings, but rather who obtained their job with their current em-
ployer after having been on the job market for about 8 years. We will discuss
the implications for such a prole, if it is robust, below.
4 Individual Fixed Eects Estimates of Returns
to Job Seniority
Of course, the assumptions made to justify the OLS specication are extremely
restrictive. In particular, in the OLS model it is likely that E (s
0
") 6= 0 due to
the presence of omitted variables that might be correlated with job seniority, and
thus the OLS estimate of returns to seniority is likely to suer from substantial
omitted variable bias. One source of such correlation, for example, could be
the possibility that more able workers are the last ones red in the event of a
negative shock to the rm. If true, this generates a relation between seniority
and earning via the omitted variable ability, and implied an upward bias in the
naive OLS estimate of returns to job seniority.
As a rst step toward resolving the problem, we next estimate returns to job
seniority using a specication that allows for individual specic heterogeneity
to be correlated with seniority and elements of the X
i;T
0
+t
matrix. The model
we estimate is
log (w
i;T
0
+t
) = X
i;T
0
+t
+ 
i
+ s
i;T
0
+t
+ "
i;T
0
+t
:
Here we are once again making the same sort of assumptions concerning the

j
and 
j
terms as in section 3 above. However, now we are explicitly allow-
ing the individual specic unobserved heterogeneity to be correlation with the
other observed characteristics, including seniority. In order to control for the
individual specic eects, we project the X
i;T
0
+t
, t and log (w
i;T
0
+t
) onto their
individual-specic means. We thus estimate an equation of the form
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(3)
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i
),

X
i
, s
i
and "
i
refer to means of the relevant variables over
all observations corresponding to individual i
13
. Under our assumptions made
13
We are assuming that "
i;T
0
+t
is distributed such that not only is E
 
"
i;T
0
+t

= 0, but
also E
 
"
I;T
0
+t
j I = i

= 0 for all i.
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above, OLS run on this specication generated unbiased consistent estimates of
 and 
14
.We use the same data as used in estimating equation (2). The results
of the estimations of each of the two OLS regressions on each of the two data
sets are found in table 3.
(insert table 3 about here)
As suggested above, the estimated returns to seniority that one nds in the OLS
estimates (coecients on level seniority of 0.069 on the whole sample, 0.061 for
the sample with outliers eliminated in the preferred specications) are greatly
reduced when one includes individual specic eects (coecients on level senior-
ity of 0.032 on the whole sample and 0.029 on the outliers-eliminated sample
in the preferred specications). Hausman-Wu tests reject the OLS specication
for both the full sample and for the outliers eliminated sample in the preferred
specications. The apparent positive bias in the estimates of returns to seniority
resulting from the omission of individual specic eects is important. As men-
tioned above, it suggests that workers that have unobserved individual specic
characteristics that are worth more on the job market are likely to also be the
workers with the highest job seniority. This makes sense if 
i
reects additional
unmeasured productive capacity and there are, say, positive costs to employer
search or screening of workers. In this case it is costly to nd good (high-
i
)
workers, and thus these workers will be last ones laid o in the event of a neg-
ative shock to the rm. The possibility that the workers are paid a xed share
of their marginal productivity independent of employer, and in particular with
their current employer, means that they will be no more nor less likely to sep-
arate for employee-induced reasons. Thus the negative correlation between 
i
and hazard rates will induce a positive correlation between 
i
and job seniority,
and thereby a positive bias in the naive OLS estimates.
(insert gure 2 about here)
Figure 2 shows the equivalent picture to gure 1, but this time using the co-
ecients from the individual xed eects estimates in table 3. Note how, as
in the case of OLS, the highest earnings are attained at some level of seniority
less than the maximum of 35 years. In this case the largest earnings seem to be
had by workers with 25 years of experience, and the is a second local maximum
at around 6 years of experience. The fact that earnings seem to decrease with
seniority after 5 years until about 15 years is also somewhat unusual, although
the OLS results imply a marginal dip in earnings to a local minimum at about
11 years of seniority. As far as we can tell, no single theory of compensation
determination predicts such a double-hump phenomenon.
Note, however, that neither of these estimators makes any allowance for rm
specic heterogeneity in compensation. This omission could cause both the OLS
and individual xed eects estimators of returns to job seniority to suer from
14
See Hsiao (1986) for a proof.
7
omitted variable bias
15
. In the following three sections we estimate returns
to seniority, allowing for rm specic heterogeneity of increasing complexity,
using the multiple step procedures suggested by Topel (1991) and Abowd et al.
(1994), and we also estimate the rm specic heterogeneity parameters 
j
and

j
separately for dierent cohorts within a rm.
5 The Topel (1991) Two-Step Estimator
We next estimate returns to job seniority using the method suggested in Topel
(1991). In this approach, one rst estimates a combined return to job senior-
ity and total labor market experience using within-employed dierenced data.
One then decomposes the combined estimate into components that arise due to
job seniority and components coming from experience. Using the notation of
equation (1), Topel's procedure generates an unbiased estimate of the combined
return ( + ) under the assumption that 
j
= 
k
=  for all j; k. He also
suggests a way to approximate the sign and size of one component of the bias
in estimated wage growth.
(insert table 4 about here)
In the rst step of the estimation process, we calculated rst dierences within
individual-rm pairs for the outliers-eliminated data. Sample statistics for this
data set appear in table 4
16
. We then regressed the rst dierenced log real
total annualized compensation cost on the rst dierenced seniority through rst
dierenced seniority to the fourth power and rst dierenced total labor market
experience through rst dierenced experience to the fourth power. This model
was estimated in two forms: with the parameter restriction 
2
= 
3
= 
4
= 0
(only level seniority included, denoted Model T1A below) and without any
parameter restrictions (Model T1B below)
17
. The results of these rst-step
models are shown in table 5 below.
(insert table 5 about here)
15
See Topel (1991) for a detailed discussion of how ignoring heterogeneity in 
j
can bias
estimated returns to seniority. Margolis (1995b) also provides a model in which the hetero-
geneity in returns to seniority 
j
and in rm specic intercepts 
j
is intimately linked to
dierences in average seniority and in compensation.
16
Note that the coecient on dierenced seniority is not exactly 1. This is because the
data allowed us to determine what fraction of the year and individual was employed with the
same rm. Factors that allow continued employment with the same rm in which seniority
and experience increase by less that 1 each year (temporary layos, for example) might be
the source of the dierence. See Topel (1991) for a discussion of the impact that this might
have on estimated returns to seniority.
17
Note that, in this specication, 
1
; 
2
; 
3
and 
4
are coecients shared by all rms, and
do not represent returns to seniority for 4 dierent rms (as would be the case using the
notation in equation (1)).
8
A Hausman-Wu test for equality of the intercept term across the two spec-
ications is rejected at most levels of signicance. Thus we once again tend to
favor the more detailed specication (model T1B), but for the sake of compa-
rability with the results in sections 3 and 4 and with the estimates to follow in
sections 6 and 7, we present both sets of results.
Exploiting the identity Exp
i;T
0
+t
= Exp
i;T
0
+ t, Topel (1991) showed that
one can separate the estimated coecient on seniority into a component that
can be attributed to seniority returns and a component that can be attributed
to experience returns. This involves regressing the dierence between current
log compensation and predicted log compensation (according the results from
the rst step estimation) on total labor market experience at the date the job
was started (Exp
i;T
0
) and a vector of other individual specic variables that
might be correlated with earnings. We thus estimated the model
log ( ~w
i;T
0
+t
) = 
1
Exp
i;T
0
+ F
i;T
0
+t
+ e
i;T
0
+t
where
log ( ~w
i;T
0
+t
) = log (w
i;T
0
+t
)  
d
(
1
+ 
1
)t
i;j;T
0
+t
  ^
2
t
2
i;j;T
0
+t
  ^
3
t
3
i;j;T
0
+t
  ^
4
t
4
i;j;T
0
+t
 
^

2
Exp
2
i;T
0
+t
 
^

3
Exp
3
i;T
0
+t
 
^

4
Exp
4
i;T
0
+t
and F
i;T
0
+t
corresponds to the other individual-specic observable components,
namely the elements of X
i;T
0
+t
not previously included, such as education, sex
and region. The results of estimations of this model based on the restricted
(Model T2A below) and unrestricted (Model T2B below) rst- step estimates
appear in table 6 below.
(insert table 6 about here)
Topel (1991) noted that although his estimator of joint returns to seniority and
returns to experience initial experience
d
(
1
+ 
1
) would be consistent, endoge-
nous job changing would generate a bias in estimated wage growth that could
be evaluated. He also suggested a method for estimating the part of the bias
in the estimate of 
1
(and thereby in the estimate of 
1
) due to covariance of
job tenure with unobserved characteristics that determine 
j
, since his approach
provides no asymptotically unbiased method for dividing the sum
d
(
1
+ 
1
) into

1
and 
1
. Table 7 below uses Topel's preferred method to break down the esti-
mates of the joint returns to seniority and experience (in levels shown in table 5)
generated by each of the two models (Model A with the parameter restrictions
and Model B unrestricted) into seniority and experience components, as well as
estimates of the bias in cross-sectional estimates of wage growth (the sum of the
biases on 
1
and 
1
), and compares them to the results in Topel (1991) from
the United States.
(insert table 7 about here)
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The Hausman-Wu tests following the rst step regression suggest that, consis-
tent with the OLS and the xed eects estimators, including the higher order
terms in seniority has a dramatic eect on estimated returns to seniority. Com-
paring our results with those found in Topel (1991), we see that returns to
seniority in France seem to be much lower than in the U.S., although the results
for returns to total labor market experience are comparable.
Interpreting the 
j
term in equation (1) as a match specic component of
earnings (i.e. 
ij
), Topel (1991) suggests potential signs for the biases in cross
section estimates of returns to seniority and experience based on endogenous
separations and rm-to-rm movements. Workers start their careers with a
particular draw from the 
ij
distribution, and when a new oer 
ik
arrives such
that 
ik
> 
ij
, the individual switches employers. Assuming that draws of 
ij
are i.i.d., the longer a person has been on the job market, the higher will be her
wage, thus implying a positive correlation between 
ij
and total labor market
experience.
The implications for the bias on job seniority are less clear. Topel (1991)
suggests that if  > 0, then individuals will need even higher 
ik
to be incited
to switch employers. Thus the individuals with long tenure are those for which

ik
  
ij
is not large enough to compensate for the loss in earnings due to
\restarting the seniority clock". Conversely, those individuals with short tenure
will be those who just received a big jump in 
ij
. These two eects imply a
downward bias in estimated returns to seniority in a cross section (as in our
section 3 and 4 estimators).
An alternative explanation is based exclusively on the increasing 
ij
over
the career. The higher the current 
ij
, the less probable that a new draw of

ij
will be suciently high to induce the worker to move. This implies that
seniority will be short for matches with relatively low 
ij
and thus relatively
low earnings. Later in the career, when the individual has sampled several 
ij
and nds herself employed at the rm that oered the highest 
ij
, tenure spells
will be long and wages higher. Given that the 
ij
is specic to the individual-
rm match, one can observe dierent individuals in the same rm with dierent
expected seniorities, where the expected seniority will be positively correlated
with 
ij
and experience will be also be positively correlated with 
ij
. This
implies that the OLS and individual xed eect estimates of returns to job
seniority will be subject to upward biases.
Comparing the results in table 7 with those in table 3, one notes that the
table 7 estimates are uniformly larger than the individual xed eects esti-
mates (0.045 versus 0.029 for level seniority, 0.061 vs 0.046 for level experience).
Although the result on total experience seems inconsistent with endogenous
switching models, the result on job seniority could be due to an explanation
similar to Topel's. On the other hand, a regression of current tenure on initial
experience yields a coecient of 0.75 (contrary to -0.25 for the United States).
This implies that, combined with the estimates of the wage growth bias in table
7, the estimate of 
1
will be biased upwards by 0.039 in model A and 0.030 in
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model B due to covariance of job tenure with unobservables that determine the
rm eect 
j
. This bias is large and positive, and could (in the case of model A)
mask an underlying zero return to seniority. As noted in the second explanation
above, however, this upward bias will be oset at least partially by a downward
bias due to improving match quality over a career (this biases up the estimate
of returns to total labor market experience and thus biases down the estimate
of returns to seniority). He provides no insight on how to sign this bias term,
although a negative value for the bias term suggests that true returns to level
experience are higher than estimated, and thus returns to seniority are lower
than estimated.
The conclusion is unclear. Estimates of both returns to job seniority and
returns to total labor market experience calculated according to the method
suggested by Topel (1991) are above the estimates derived from xed eects
estimates. Acknowledging the fact that the partition of the joint returns is
not consistently estimated, and since (under the equal  and cohort-invariant 
and  assumptions) the sum of the two returns is consistently estimated, this
suggests that the negative bias in the xed eect estimated returns to seniority
outweighs the positive bias in the xed eect returns to experience in the case of
France. However, in the notation of equation (1),  is rm specic and identical
for all workers within the same rm. Thus Topel's and our explanations of the
sources of bias in returns to tenure actually relate to the 
i;T
0
+t
in equation (1).
A literal interpretation of his econometric procedure might impose the same
constraints on  as in the OLS and xed eect estimators, while requiring us
to treat equation (1) as having a match specic random eect in the \residual"

i;T
0
+t
.
Lastly, the absence of any control for 
i
in the second step estimates is
another potential source of bias in the decomposition of the combined seniority-
experience term. If workers with higher individual eects have longer seniorities
(as suggested in section 4 above), then the share of joint returns attributed to
seniority will be overestimated in the second step regression. The estimate of the
joint return to job seniority and total labor market experience is still consistently
estimated, since the rst step regression used within-individual-rm dierences.
Thus although this suggests that the estimate of returns to seniority in the
Topel (1991) method is biased upwards, since the sum of the two coecients is
unbiased, the wrong-signed bias on the returns to experience estimate remains
unexplained.
6 The Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1994)
Projection Method Estimator
All of these procedures have found signicant (however small) returns to senior-
ity in the fully saturated specications on the outliers-eliminated data. They
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share a common assumption, however; namely that all rms reward seniority
in the same manner (
j
= 
k
=  for all j; k). If this assumption were to be
violated, the estimated returns to seniority would be a sort of weighted average
of the rm-specic returns. Thus even if only a few rms in the sample rewarded
seniority and these rms contributed a high enough number of observations to
the data set, we would run the risk of estimating positive economy-wide returns,
and we might incorrectly assume that the majority of rms in the economy pro-
vided positive returns to job seniority.
Abowd et al. (1994) show that this is false
18
. Their estimation procedure al-
lows them to account for individual- and rm- specic eects on earnings, as well
as estimating rm-specic returns to seniority. Due to data limitations, how-
ever, they restrict their consideration to a specication equivalent to equation
(1) with a linear spline in seniority (break point at 10 years of job seniority)
under the assumption that 
j;T
0
= 
j;T
1
= 
j
and 
j;T
0
= 
j;T
1
= 
j
for all
T
0
; T
1
19
. Using the same data as we use here (the outliers-eliminated sample),
they nd no signicant returns to seniority on average (-3.37E-5 for men and
8.28E-4 for women across individuals). However, when looking across rms,
they nd a standard error in returns to seniority that is relatively large (0.077
relative to a mean across rms of 2.7E-3) and encompasses all of the above
estimated returns within one standard deviation of the mean estimated returns
to seniority. This implies that there is substantial heterogeneity in estimated
returns to seniority, and thus the assumption inherent in the Topel (1991) pro-
cedure that 
j
= 
k
=  for all j; k needs to be reconsidered. Although it
provides some useful information that dierent theoretical models can inter-
pret, even the Abowd et al. (1994) projection method estimator ignores cohort
eects. These cohort-rm specic returns to job seniority, and in particular
their variance within rm or within cohort, provide information that can be of
use for interpreting various models of compensation.
7 Cohort-Based Estimates of Returns to Job
Seniority
With the knowledge that there is substantial across-rm heterogeneity in es-
timated returns to job seniority, we took the Abowd et al. (1994) projection
18
Since Abowd et al. (1994) used the same data we use here and estimate a model very
similar to equation (1) - the only exception being that they also estimate a linear spline with a
break at 10 years of seniority - we do not recalculate their results. What follows is a summary
of the results that can be found in their paper. We use equation (1) and the previous discussion
to interpret their results.
19
Because sample sizes necessary to estimate a full quartic specication for each rm are
larger than those needed to estimate a simple linear spline, Abowd et al. (1994) chose the
option of being able to estimate rm specic returns to seniority for a larger number of rms
rather than that of estimating a full quartic specication for the fewer rms with enough data
to meet the conditions necessary for identication.
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method as a starting point for estimating directly the model described in equa-
tion (1). Because estimating cohort-rm specic intercepts (
^

j;T
0
) and seniority
returns (^
j;T
0
) is particularly demanding on the data, we were not able to ob-
tain large enough sample sizes for every cohort in every rm in the data. We
were able to use 3,677,633 of our 5,305,108 observations to calculate cohort-
rm specic intercepts and slopes, 4,654,064 observations for the estimation of
rm specic (but pooled across cohorts) slopes and intercepts (as in Abowd et
al. (1994)), and all 5,305,108 observations for calculating cohort-specic (but
pooled across rms) slopes and intercepts
20
. This distribution of observations
across groups is encouraging in two respects. First, for 88 percent of the obser-
vations we are able to estimate at least a rm specic
^

j
and ^
j
, and 79 percent
of these observations can be used to recover the relevant cohort-rm specic
^

j;T
0
and ^
j;T
0
terms. Second, we can use all of the observations in estimating
cohort specic intercepts and slopes. This is not surprising, given that the data
set eliminated all individuals younger than 15 years old and older than 65 years
old.
The Abowd et al. (1994) projection method was followed up to the point
where they estimate rm-specic intercepts and seniority splines. Thus the
estimated eects of education, total labor market experience, sex and region
on the log of total real annual compensation found in Abowd et al. (1994) are
unchanged. We then estimated equation (1) separately for each entering cohort
in each rm in the cohort-rm group, and we pooled the remaining observations
to estimate equation (1) for each cohort in the pool of rms. We also estimated
equation (1) for each rm in the rm-only group
21
. For the cohort-only group,
we estimated equation (1) by pooling all observations within the same cohort,
independent of rm, and running the regression cohort by cohort.
Using the cohort-rm estimates, we then calculated the mean asymptotic
within-rm and within-cohort variance in
^

j;T
0
and ^
j;T
0
. Asymptotic within
variances were calculated as
var

^

j

= var
j

p
n
j;T
0
^

j;T
0

var (^
j
) = var
j
 
p
n
j;T
0
^
j;T
0

var

^

T
0

= var
T
0

p
n
j;T
0
^

j;T
0

var (^
T
0
) = var
T
0
 
p
n
j;T
0
^
j;T
0

where var
j
refers to the variance over all estimates in rm j, var
T
0
refers to the
20
Clearly, the data used to estimate rm-cohort specic or rm specic  and  are more
likely to come from observations of individuals employed in larger rms. Unfortunately there
is no way to recover cohort-rm specic
^

j;T
0
and ^
j;T
0
when there is not enough data
present. Thus the estimation strategy implicitly imposes a sort of \ocean of small, identical
rms" constraint, in which a single  or  is estimated for all observations coming from
insuciently present employers. This is equivalent to supposing that small rms have the
same compensation policies and reward seniority identically.
21
This is essentially what is done in Abowd et al. (1994).
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variance over all estimates in entry cohort T
0
, and n
j;T
0
refers to the number of
observations used to calculate the corresponding
^

j;T
0
or ^
j;T
0
. Table 8 presents
these results. We can see that the average variance in
^

j;T
0
is much larger
within cohorts than within rms (16.905 versus 1.058). On the other hand, the
average variance in ^
j;T
0
is not very dierent within cohorts as opposed to within
rms (1.380 versus 1.229). We also note that the negative correlation between
^

j
and ^
j
observed by Abowd et al. (1994) is present even at the cohort-rm
level, although the negative correlation is stronger across rms within a cohort
(-0.860) than across cohorts within a rm (-0.724). This stronger relation within
cohort than within rm is likely due to the larger variance of
^

j;T
0
within cohort
than within rm.
(insert table 8 about here)
8 Interpretation of the Empirical Results
The estimators presented in sections 3, 4 and 5 show that methods that impose
identical returns to seniority across dierent rms and cohorts tend to predict
positive returns, whereas when each rm and/or cohort is allowed its own com-
pensation policy and return to seniority, the average return becomes zero. The
projection based estimator of Abowd et al. (1994) is a good step in the right di-
rection, but when we estimate slopes and intercepts separately for cohort-rms,
we nd still more variance.
The pattern of this variance, and in particular the characteristics of the
negative covariances that we nd, are quite interesting from a theoretical point
of view. For example, consider the framework of compensation determination
that is suggested by Beaudry and DiNardo (1991). In this framework of implicit
contracts with costless mobility, one ought to observe signicant variance within
rm by cohort in both the intercept
^

j;T
0
and the slope ^
j;T
0
. We only nd
moderate variance within rm in both intercepts and slopes (table 8). However,
this theory suggests that all individuals of the same entry cohort where hired
under the same general labor market conditions, and their wage growth is driven
by the same general shocks. Thus there should be no variance within cohort
across rms in slopes or intercepts. This implication is not borne out by the
data for the
^

j;T
0
terms, although it seems more plausible for ^
j;T
0
. If one would
like to relax this theory, say by permitting an additional rm-specic shock and
adding small mobility costs, one might be able to generate variance across rms
within cohorts in the
^

j;T
0
terms, but there is no reason why this should only
aect intercepts and not slopes. Thus the theory of implicit contracts with
costless mobility, which could have rationalized the results of Abowd et al.
(1994) by insisting on the fact that no controls were made for dierences across
rms in the cohort-composition of their workforces, has a harder time explaining
the data when such controls are made and residual heterogeneity across rms
14
within cohorts in compensation policies persists.
Another theoretical model, that of Margolis (1995b), suggests that screen-
ing considerations could cause rms to oer dierent slopes and intercepts. The
combination of endogenously chosen compensation policies and seniority returns
plus variations in the quality of the entry cohorts will generate both heterogene-
ity across rms within cohorts (since dierent oered compensation policies and
seniority returns attract dierent sorts of workers), and across cohorts within
rms (since the initial composition of the cohort will be a function of supply-side
conditions as well). This theory can accommodate our heterogeneity results for
^

j;T
0
within cohort with ease, and can explain the small average within rm
variance in
^

j;T
0
by small variance in supply-side factors. Unfortunately, the
large average variance in
^

j;T
0
within cohorts should be associated with a larger
average variance in ^
j;T
0
within cohorts, and this is less clear in the results pre-
sented in section 7. Similar experiments can be tried with other models that
generate cohort eects
22
, but to the best of our knowledge there is no single
theory that can adequately explain the empirical results found in section 7.
9 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated the implications of various simplifying assump-
tions on estimates of returns to job seniority, and has highlighted certain prob-
lems that were previously unknown by making use of variations in compensation
policy and returns to seniority within rms across entering cohorts. A ranking
of the order of magnitude of our results gives the highest estimates for OLS
(6.9 percent increase per year), followed by the Topel (1991) two step estimator
(4.5 percent per year), the individual xed eects estimator (3.2 percent per
year) and nally the Abowd et al. (1994) projection based estimator and a vari-
ant that estimates cohort-rm eects (both with essentially zero mean returns
to seniority across rms). The remarkable heterogeneity in rm specic, and
particularly cohort-rm specic compensation policies and seniority rewards in-
vites further research, both theoretical and empirical, to attempt to explain the
sources of this heterogeneity in a convincing manner.
22
Margolis (1995a) demonstrates these thought experiments in more detail.
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Figure 1: OLS Returns to Job Seniority
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Figure 2: Individual Fixed Eects Returns to Job Seniority
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics
All Observations Outliers Eliminated
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Log(Total Compensation Cost) 4.251 (0.556) 4.258 (0.519)
Seniority 6.379 (7.138) 6.391 (7.140)
Seniority^2/100 0.916 (1.485) 0.918 (1.486)
Seniority^3/1000 1.590 (3.290) 1.593 (3.292)
Seniority^4/10000 3.044 (7.721) 3.050 (7.727)
Experience 16.610 (11.927) 16.610 (11.923)
Experience^2/100 4.181 (4.938) 4.180 (4.935)
Experience^3/1000 12.615 (19.552) 12.608 (19.535)
Experience^4/10000 41.869 (78.919) 41.834 (78.825)
Elementary School 0.168 (0.157) 0.168 (0.157)
Junior High School 0.067 (0.089) 0.067 (0.089)
High School Grad 0.059 (0.084) 0.059 (0.084)
Basic Vo-Tech 0.239 (0.178) 0.240 (0.178)
Advanced Vo-Tech 0.064 (0.087) 0.064 (0.087)
Tech U/Undergrad 0.060 (0.097) 0.060 (0.097)
Grad School 0.039 (0.085) 0.039 (0.085)
1977 0.100 (0.300) 0.100 (0.300)
1978 0.102 (0.303) 0.103 (0.303)
1979 0.104 (0.305) 0.104 (0.305)
1980 0.104 (0.305) 0.104 (0.305)
1982 0.102 (0.302) 0.102 (0.302)
1984 0.098 (0.297) 0.098 (0.297)
1985 0.097 (0.295) 0.097 (0.295)
1986 0.098 (0.298) 0.098 (0.298)
1987 0.099 (0.299) 0.099 (0.299)
Male 0.647 (0.478) 0.647 (0.478)
Paris Region 0.269 (0.443) 0.268 (0.443)
n=5,325,352 n=5,305,108
Notes:The outliers eliminated sample of the DAS eliminates all observations more 
than 5 standard deviations away from the predicted wage in an OLS wage regression 
of log real annualized total compensation cost on sex, Paris region, experience-
experience^4, 7 education indicators and 9 year indicators.  The French education
 levels were translated into their closest U.S. equivalents.
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Table 2:  OLS Results (Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
All Observations Outliers Eliminated
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 3.271 (1.25E-03) 3.265 (1.26E-03) 3.287 (1.14E-03) 3.284 (1.15E-03)
Seniority 0.014 (3.50E-05) 0.069 (3.22E-04) 0.013 (3.18E-05) 0.061 (2.93E-04)
Seniority^2/100 0 (0) -0.931 (6.02E-03) 0 (0) -0.817 (5.47E-03)
Seniority^3/1000 0 (0) 0.494 (3.75E-03) 0 (0) 0.436 (3.41E-03)
Seniority^4/10000 0 (0) -0.081 (7.36E-04) 0 (0) -0.072 (6.68E-04)
Experience 0.046 (2.81E-04) 0.034 (2.90E-04) 0.046 (2.55E-04) 0.035 (2.64E-04)
Experience^2/100 -0.184 (2.56E-03) -0.072 (2.63E-03) -0.180 (2.33E-03) -0.083 (2.39E-03)
Experience^3/1000 0.038 (8.66E-04) 0.003 (8.85E-04) 0.038 (7.87E-04) 0.006 (8.05E-04)
Experience^4/10000 -0.003 (9.64E-05) 0.000 (9.83E-05) -0.003 (8.77E-05) 0.000 (8.95E-05)
Elementary School 0.040 (9.18E-04) 0.046 (1.72E-03) 0.039 (8.34E-04) 0.048 (1.57E-03)
Junior High School 0.084 (9.14E-04) 0.391 (2.44E-03) 0.077 (8.30E-04) 0.394 (2.22E-03)
High School Grad 0.108 (9.13E-04) 0.587 (2.80E-03) 0.100 (8.29E-04) 0.596 (2.55E-03)
Basic Vo-Tech 0.113 (9.13E-04) 0.226 (1.45E-03) 0.107 (8.29E-04) 0.225 (1.32E-03)
Advanced Vo-Tech 0.140 (9.21E-04) 0.577 (2.48E-03) 0.134 (8.36E-04) 0.579 (2.25E-03)
Tech U/Undergrad 0.178 (9.33E-04) 0.580 (2.39E-03) 0.170 (8.48E-04) 0.582 (2.17E-03)
Grad School 0.199 (9.37E-04) 1.351 (2.75E-03) 0.190 (8.51E-04) 1.373 (2.50E-03)
1977 0.214 (9.34E-04) 0.059 (9.26E-04) 0.207 (8.49E-04) 0.054 (8.41E-04)
1978 0.221 (9.34E-04) 0.103 (9.27E-04) 0.216 (8.49E-04) 0.093 (8.42E-04)
1979 0.061 (1.73E-03) 0.125 (9.28E-04) 0.062 (1.57E-03) 0.114 (8.43E-04)
1980 0.401 (2.45E-03) 0.127 (9.31E-04) 0.404 (2.22E-03) 0.117 (8.45E-04)
1982 0.599 (2.81E-03) 0.148 (9.41E-04) 0.608 (2.55E-03) 0.138 (8.55E-04)
1984 0.246 (1.45E-03) 0.183 (9.55E-04) 0.244 (1.31E-03) 0.172 (8.67E-04)
1985 0.595 (2.48E-03) 0.202 (9.59E-04) 0.596 (2.25E-03) 0.190 (8.71E-04)
1986 0.586 (2.40E-03) 0.216 (9.57E-04) 0.589 (2.18E-03) 0.206 (8.70E-04)
1987 1.362 (2.75E-03) 0.224 (9.58E-04) 1.384 (2.51E-03) 0.215 (8.71E-04)
Male 0.206 (4.60E-04) 0.204 (4.61E-04) 0.203 (4.18E-04) 0.201 (4.19E-04)
Paris Region 0.139 (4.74E-04) 0.142 (4.73E-04) 0.142 (4.31E-04) 0.145 (4.30E-04)
R-square=0.293 R-square=0.297 R-square=0.331 R-square=0.337
n=5,325,352 n=5,305,108
H0: γ(Model 1, All Observations) = γ(Model 1, Outliers Eliminated) χ2(1)=0.29
H0: γ(Model 2, All Observations) = γ(Model 2, Outliers Eliminated) χ2(1)=2.50
H0: γ(Model 1, All Observations) = γ(Model 2, All Observations) χ2(1)=11.56
H0: γ(Model 1, Outliers Eliminated) = γ(Model 2, Outliers Eliminated) χ2(1)=9.55
Notes:The outliers eliminated sample of the DAS eliminates all observations more than 5 standard deviations away from the 
predicted wage in an OLS wage regression of log real annualized total compensation cost on sex, Paris region, experience-
experience^4, 7 education indicators and 9 year indicators.  The French education levels were translated into their closest
 U.S. equivalents.
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Table 3:  Individual Fixed-Effects Results (Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
All Observations Outliers Eliminated
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Seniority 0.003 (4.58E-05) 0.032 (2.86E-04) 0.003 (3.93E-05) 0.029 (2.45E-04)
Seniority^2/100 0 (0) -0.467 (5.28E-03) 0 (0) -0.425 (4.53E-03)
Seniority^3/1000 0 (0) 0.247 (3.24E-03) 0 (0) 0.227 (2.78E-03)
Seniority^4/10000 0 (0) -0.042 (6.27E-04) 0 (0) -0.039 (5.37E-04)
Experience 0.055 (3.84E-04) 0.046 (3.97E-04) 0.054 (3.31E-04) 0.046 (3.41E-04)
Experience^2/100 -0.347 (2.75E-03) -0.274 (2.86E-03) -0.343 (2.37E-03) -0.278 (2.46E-03)
Experience^3/1000 0.080 (9.69E-04) 0.056 (1.00E-03) 0.079 (8.32E-04) 0.057 (8.62E-04)
Experience^4/10000 -0.007 (1.12E-04) -0.004 (1.15E-04) -0.007 (9.64E-05) -0.005 (9.89E-05)
1977 0.023 (6.96E-04) 0.035 (7.08E-04) 0.024 (5.98E-04) 0.035 (6.08E-04)
1978 0.063 (7.90E-04) 0.079 (8.09E-04) 0.063 (6.79E-04) 0.077 (6.95E-04)
1979 0.093 (9.24E-04) 0.110 (9.45E-04) 0.092 (7.94E-04) 0.107 (8.12E-04)
1980 0.107 (1.08E-03) 0.124 (1.10E-03) 0.108 (9.28E-04) 0.123 (9.47E-04)
1982 0.151 (1.43E-03) 0.169 (1.45E-03) 0.151 (1.23E-03) 0.167 (1.25E-03)
1984 0.200 (1.79E-03) 0.220 (1.81E-03) 0.199 (1.54E-03) 0.217 (1.56E-03)
1985 0.224 (1.97E-03) 0.244 (1.98E-03) 0.222 (1.69E-03) 0.240 (1.71E-03)
1986 0.256 (2.15E-03) 0.277 (2.17E-03) 0.256 (1.85E-03) 0.274 (1.87E-03)
1987 0.277 (2.34E-03) 0.298 (2.36E-03) 0.278 (2.02E-03) 0.297 (2.03E-03)
Paris Region 0.072 (1.08E-03) 0.073 (1.08E-03) 0.081 (9.31E-04) 0.082 (9.29E-04)
R-square=0.741 R-square=0.742 R-square=0.782 R-square=0.783
n=5,325,352 n=5,305,108
H0: γ(Model 2, All Observations, OLS) = γ(Model 2, All Observations, Fixed Effects) χ2(1)=39.33
H0: γ(Model 2, Outliers Eliminated, OLS) = γ(Model 2, Outliers Eliminated, Fixed Effects) χ2(1)=21.65
Notes:The outliers eliminated sample of the DAS eliminates all observations more than 5 standard deviations away from the 
predicted wage in an OLS wage regression of log real annualized total compensation cost on sex, Paris region, experience-
experience^4, 7 education indicators and 9 year indicators.  The French education levels were translated into their closest
 U.S. equivalents.
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Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics for Differenced Data
Variable Differenced Data
Name Mean Std. Dev.
∆w 0.035 0.270
Seniority, Experience 0.963 0.149
Seniority^2/100 0.164 0.143
Seniority^3/1000 0.355 0.471
Seniority^4/10000 0.815 1.411
Experience^2/100 0.361 0.233
Experience^3/1000 1.382 1.488
Experience^4/10000 5.556 7.897
n=2,517,026
Notes:  These data are drawn from the outliers
eliminated subsample of the DAS.  Differences are
calculated within individual-firm matches across
time.
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Table 5:  First Step Topel Model Results (Std. Dev. in Parentheses)
Differenced Data
Variable Model T1A Model T1B
Seniority, Experience 0.087 (6.83E-04) 0.106 (7.44E-04)
Seniority^2/100 0 (0) -0.551 (9.32E-03)
Seniority^3/1000 0 (0) 0.300 (6.21E-03)
Seniority^4/10000 0 (0) -0.052 (1.25E-03)
Experience^2/100 -0.297 (6.46E-03) -0.231 (6.60E-03)
Experience^3/1000 0.057 (2.28E-03) 0.040 (2.34E-03)
Experience^4/10000 -0.004 (2.61E-04) -0.002 (2.66E-04)
R-square=0.022 R-square=0.020
H0: γ1+β1(Model T1A) = γ1+β1(Model T1B) χ2(1)=5.92
Notes:  These data are drawn from the outliers eliminated subsample of the 
DAS.  Differences are calculated within individual-firm matches across time.
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Table 6:  Second Step Topel Model Results (Std. Dev. in Parentheses)
All Observations (Outliers Removed)
Variable Model T2A Model T2B
Initial Experience 0.066 (3.42E-05) 0.061 (3.29E-05)
Elementary School 2.023 (2.51E-03) 2.062 (2.42E-03)
Junior High School 2.644 (3.86E-03) 2.682 (3.72E-03)
High School Grad 2.433 (4.57E-03) 2.475 (4.40E-03)
Basic Vo-Tech 2.263 (1.96E-03) 2.299 (1.88E-03)
Advanced Vo-Tech 1.738 (4.02E-03) 1.801 (3.87E-03)
Tech U/Undergrad 2.253 (3.81E-03) 2.329 (3.67E-03)
Grad School 1.822 (4.53E-03) 1.900 (4.36E-03)
1977 1.249 (1.40E-03) 1.245 (1.34E-03)
1978 1.374 (1.38E-03) 1.362 (1.33E-03)
1979 1.447 (1.37E-03) 1.429 (1.32E-03)
1980 1.504 (1.36E-03) 1.480 (1.31E-03)
1982 1.643 (1.37E-03) 1.608 (1.31E-03)
1984 1.790 (1.38E-03) 1.744 (1.32E-03)
1985 1.787 (1.38E-03) 1.742 (1.33E-03)
1986 1.802 (1.37E-03) 1.758 (1.32E-03)
1987 1.820 (1.37E-03) 1.776 (1.32E-03)
Male 0.484 (7.48E-04) 0.496 (7.20E-04)
Paris Region 0.296 (7.94E-04) 0.287 (7.65E-04)
R-square=0.969 R-square=0.970
n=5,305,108
Notes:Initial experience is measured as total labor market experience in the year that
the employee joined the firm.  Model T2A refers to the second step of the linear
specification in seniority, and model T2B refers to the second step of the quartic 
specification in seniority.
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Table 7:  Estimated Returns Using the Topel Two-Step Estimator
Model Total Seniority Experience Wage Growth
Type Returns Bias
Model A 0.087 0.021 0.066 -0.052
Model B 0.106 0.045 0.061 -0.040
Topel (1991) 0.126 0.054 0.071 0.002
Notes:Model A refers to the linear specification in seniority, and model B 
refers to the quartic specification in seniority.  Wage growth bias refers to 
the estimate of the bias in cross section estimates of the sum of returns to
seniority and experience.
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Table 8:  Analysis of the Cohort-Firm Estimates of φ and γ
Within Within
Criterion Firm Cohort
Average Variance in φ 1.058 16.905
Average Variance in γ 1.229 1.380
Average Correlation Coefficient (φ,γ) -0.724 -0.860
Notes:The variances measures are average asymptotic variances
within the particular firm or cohort.  The within firm averages are
calculated over 39,876 firms, while the within cohort averages are
calculated over 43 cohorts.
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